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Bottoms up? Not just yet… the 2012 Minimum Pricing legislation put to the Advocate
General’s test…
Posted on September 5, 2015 by aandreangeli
Controversial legislation always keeps the mood and attention of commentators rather alert and the 2012 Alcohol
(Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act has been no exception. Come September 3 and while it cannot be said that the
wait is over, it is certainly clear that the proceedings before the CJEU have reached a keystone, namely the
Opinion of AG Yves Bot.
While this Opinion will keep commentators entertained for several months to come and until we have a final
ruling, several points are worth making…
First of all, in respect of the nature of the MPU as a restriction on trade among member states, it is of great
interest the fact that the Advocate General has addressed not just the question of whether this measure should
represent a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction (MEQR) but also whether it could be
characterised as a selling arrangement. Clearly, and maybe not surprisingly, the Advocate General took the view
that the correct way to characterise these measures would be ro regard them as MEQRs: to the extent that the
MPU legislation mandated upon undertakings engaged in alcoholic beverages’ sales in Scotland the reaping of a
“compulsory minimum profit margin”, it had the effect of “cancelling out” any price advantage stemming from
lower costs, thus making access to the Scottish market more difficult for cheaper foreign goods that could have
relied, conceivably, on that advantage to make themselves more attractive. As to the applicability of the Keck
principles to the Act, the fact of this or of any restraint on trade being prima facie caught in this category did not
exempt them from an assessment conducted in light of the Treaty free movement of goods: thus, they could have
only escaped being caught by Article 34 if it could have been shown that they were not “discriminatory”, i.e.
capable of placing non-domestic good at a disadvantage. In the event, AG Bot expressed the view that since the
Act resulted in the competitive advantage characterising cheaper foreign goods being de facto “cancelled out” by
the compulsory minimum profit margin it commanded, it had such an effect.
Thereafter, the question of whether the restraints in issue could have benefitted from the application of Article 36
TFEU was examined, with a number of interesting and in many ways encouraging (especially for the Scottish
Government) observations as to the extent to which minimum prices could be suitable to attaining public interest
goals. AG Bot expressed the view that introducing such measures did not only represent an “appropriate
response” to the need to tackle serious health and social harm (as the one stemming from hazardous alcohol
consumption in Scotland) but could also be regarded as a “systematic” and “coherent” way of addressing these
concerns.
The ‘necessity’ assessment was, however, admittedly far less reassuring for the Scottish authorities…  The
Advocate General confirmed that the 2012 Act had a clear “deterrent effect” and could have resulted in a loss of
sales especially for the beverages in the “lowest end” of the market. However, in his view the central question was
to what extent there were alternatives to the MPU that were capable of attaining the same type and level of public
policy gains, while being less restrictive of the freedom of movement of goods than the 2012 Act. A general
increase in the indirect taxation on the sale of alcoholic beverages–as it has occurred, for instance, in the context
of the trade in tobacco products–came inevitably in the frame of that assessment.
AG Bot recognised that tax hikes were undoubtedly less controversial in light of the internal market rules, due to
their being generally applicable as well as not capable of restraining the freedom to compete on price. It was also
noted that their impact could have been more pervasive in terms of attaining its aim of improving public health
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generally: the Advocate General observed that imposing higher indirect taxes on alcohol sales seemed capable of
having an impact on consumption not only among lower tier consumers but also among drinkers belonging to
middle-income social milieux; in his view, this move could have resulted in reducing health harm across the board
and not only in the “target social layer”. On that basis it was stated that while it remained open to the member
states to choose to introduce a minimum price-per-unit framework for the purpose of improving public health
among their population, on account of their restrictive impact on the free movement of goods they were under an
obligation to show that these measures had “additional advantages or fewer disadvantages” than other, prima
facie equally appropriate measures. Importantly, the Advocate General made clear that the circumstance that
alternative measures could yield additional benefits for public health “at large” could not be relied upon to exclude
their adoption in favour of MPU rules.
So much for the assessment of the MPU against the background of the free movement rules… it may be argued
that the AG Opinion is broadly consistent with the existing approaches characterising the CJEU case law. 
However, a few more general points are worth highlighting for the benefit of further discussion in competition law
circles: one has to do with the changing nature of the Common Agricultural Policy, which is now a field falling
within the shared competence of the EU and of its member states.  It should be noted that for AG Bot, this should
not be regarded as a “market free zone”, which is interesting in the face of current debates on pricing of key
agricultural commodities, such as milk and of concerns as to the increasing market power of purchasers vis-a-vis
farmers.  The second relates, instead, to the relation between the CJEU and the national courts as the latter look
to apply a preliminary ruling to the facts at issue in the proceedings that have led to the reference… It is
undeniable that AG Bot emphasised the cooperative and egalitarian nature of this interplay, thus calling forcefully
the referring to court to conduct the ‘appropriateness’ and ‘proportionality’ assessment of the MPU in light of all
available evidence and within the requirements of national autonomy and of overall due process.  Nonetheless it is
equally clear that this leaves the Court of Session with a complex task which, due to the heated political
undertones of the legislation, is going to present its own challenges.
And finally… what now for resale price maintenance? Due to the nature of the MPU as de facto representing
“statutory RPM”, it may legitimately be queried whether the forthcoming ruling may have a bearing on the
ongoing debate as to whether we should move from regarding resale price maintenance as a ‘by object’
infringement of Article 101 to assessing it instead as a ‘by effect’ restriction on competition.  It is acknowledged
that the confines of the reference did not allow the analysis of these questions: however, it is expected
that issues arising from the application of the legislation to future sales’ contracts and especially on the extent to
which the latter may be held to be against the competition rules on account of having to conform to the minimum
pricing rules may well become live in the event of the 2012 Act being allowed to stand. On this point, it is
reminded that especially after the CIF preliminary ruling (Case C-198/01, [2003] ECR I-8055), the space for
invoking the observance of obligations stemming from national legislation has become very constrained.
Nonetheless, it can legitimately be suggested that the opinion gives some food for thought when it comes to
considering to what extent the attainment of high levels of public heath may provide a justification for restraining
the freedom to set prices in markets in “harmful” goods such as alcohol.  Given the admittedly cautious but still
potentially promising endorsement of the MPU scheme as an “appropriate means” to securing high levels of
public health, one may legitimately wonder whether time may be ripe for looking again at resale price
maintenance that may be motivated by prima facie public policy objectives (such as past experiments in the field
of book sales, as the reference to Fachverband reminds us). In light of the AG Bot’s appraisal, one could certainly
expect that any such arrangement may have to clear high hurdles when it comes to meeting the requirements
enshrined in the “negative conditions” of Article 101(3). Nonetheless, the Advocate General seems to suggest that
this is not going to be impossible for undertakings conceivably seeking to rely on Article 101(3) for the purpose of
avoiding the sanction of nullity that could befall agreements containing a minimum pricing clause–even one that
is “mandated” by domestic legislation.
Article 101(3), however, may not be the only avenue through which resale price maintenance clauses that may
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avoid the consequences of infringing the Treaty competition rules. The case law of the CJEU in recent years seems
to have indicated a trend toward a more “in-context” approach to reading Article 101(1) of the Treaty in respect of
practices facially motivated by concerns of general interest. It is suggested on this point that judgments such as
Meca Medina (case C-519/04 P, [2006] ECR I-6991) and Wouters (case C-309/99, [2002] ECR I-1577) , with their
emphasis on the requirements of “appropriateness” and “indispensability”, may well provide the space within
which benefits arising from resale price maintenance aimed at securing public policy goals can be assessed against
the loss of competition they can entail.
In conclusion, AG Bot’s Opinion reminds all of us of the complexities arising from the interplay of the single
market principles with other delicate objectives of general interest, on which member states claim (legitimately)
the right to set out what their agenda is going to be.  Beyond the legal niceties, therefore, there are wider political
and societal concerns that make the job entrusted with the Court of Session very difficult and sensitive.  Walking
on the tightrope of balancing out the needs of open markets with the demands of the protection of the citizens of
Europe is a perilous and in many way invidious job–yet, there is every reason to think that the Court of Session
will rise to the challenge of having to apply the forthcoming ruling to the case pending before it.  As for the impact
on wider legal principles, including those of competition, we will have to wait for the next instalment of this
long-running and fascinating saga… no time as yet to clink the glasses for us!
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